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 ABSTRACT 
Financial crises seem to have become the norm rather than the exception 
since 1992. In recognition of the frequency with which countries seem to be 
hit by financial crises, any typical undergraduate course in Money and 
Banking nowadays includes a section on financial crisis in emerging 
economies. While these texts offer useful and up-to-date discussions on 
concepts such as financial crises and sterilization of capital flows, there does 
not seem to be any attempt to link the discussion of these contemporary 
issues to the age-old analytics of the money market and money multiplier. 
This paper examines the impact of a crisis of confidence and resultant capital 
outflows from a small and open economy, and the possible policy options in 
response to such outflows using simple tools and definitions that will be 
familiar to any Money and Banking/Intermediate Macroeconomics student. To 
facilitate the discussion, examples are drawn from the East Asian crisis of 
1997-98 (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand), though the analysis 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Financial crises seem to have become the norm rather than the exception 
since 1992
1. Specifically, in 1992-93, Europe was faced with the very real 
possibility of a complete collapse of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM). The Italian lira and British pound withdrew from the ERM, three other 
currencies (viz. the Spanish peseta, Irish pound and Danish krona) were 
devalued, and there was a substantial widening of the bands within which the 
currencies could fluctuate. In 1994-95, there was the Mexican currency crisis 
which saw a steep devaluation of the peso and Mexico on the brink of default. 
There were also spillover effects on Argentina and Brazil (so-called “Tequila 
effect”). Between July 1997 and mid-1998, the world experienced the effects of 
the East Asian crisis, which started somewhat innocuously with a run on the Thai 
baht, but spread swiftly to a number of other regional currencies, most notably 
the Indonesian rupiah, Malaysian ringgit and Korean won (so-called “Tom-Yam 
effect”). Other large emerging economies such as Russia and Brazil also 
experienced periods of significant market weakness and required the assistance 
                                            
1 The term “financial crisis” is used here generically to involve a dual crisis of the 
financial system (“banking crisis”) and the balance of payments (“currency crisis”). The 
co-existence of banking and currency crises has been found to be the norm during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Most frequently banking crises appear to have taken the 
lead (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), and these twin crises seem to be far more 
pervasive in developing economies than developed ones (Glick and Hutchison, 1999). 
Banking crises themselves seem to be more likely following financial liberalization, with 
sharp increases in domestic (bank) lending acting as significant predictors of currency 
crises. The IMF (1998) has suggested that the greater frequency of banking crises 
worldwide since the 1980s is “possibly related to the financial sector liberalization that 
occurred in many countries during this period” (p.115).     1
of the IMF. The Russian ruble was devalued in August 1998 -- during a period of 
exceptional financial market turbulence (BIS, 1999) -- while the Brazilian real’s 
peg was eventually broken in January 1999. A number of other smaller emerging 
economies such as Turkey and Ecuador also experienced currency crises in the 
1990s, with Argentina and Venezuela being the most recent victims.  
In recognition of this fact, any typical undergraduate course in Money and 
Banking nowadays includes a section on financial crisis in emerging 
economies(Chapter 24, pp.494-7 in Mishkin and Chapter 22, pp.595-8 in 
Hubbard). While these texts offer useful and up-to-date discussions of concepts 
such as financial crises and sterilization of capital flows, the discussions 
generally seem to be “stand alones”. There is no attempt to link the discussion of 
these important contemporary issues to the age-old analytics of the money 
market and money multiplier (Chapters 15, 16 and 21 in Mishkin and Chapters 
17, 18 and 23 in Hubbard).  
This paper examines the impact of a crisis of confidence and resultant 
capital outflows from a small and open economy and the possible policy options 
in response to such outflows using simple tools and definitions that will be 
familiar to any student who has successfully completed a Money and Banking 
course or an Intermediate Macroeconomics course for that matter. To facilitate 
the discussion, examples are drawn from the East Asian crisis of 1997-98 
(Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand), though the analysis remains 
pertinent to emerging economies in general
2. 
                                            
2 No attempt is made here to offer a detailed discussion of the East Asian crisis. 
Interested readers are referred to Berg (1999), Corsetti et al. (1999) and Rajan (1999).   2
 
2. Analytical  Framework 
2.1 Preliminaries   
Consider a semi-open economy (“foreign country”) in the following two 
senses: (a) the risk adjusted interest parity holds (eq. 1) and (b) exchange rate 
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where e = foreign currency per US$, i = Thai interest rates, i* = LIBOR rate; rp = 
currency or country risk premium of the emerging economy; P
f
t is the foreign 
price level; P
US
t is the US price level; and λ  is a convergence term  0 < λ  < 1. Eq. 
2 essentially states that purchasing power parity (PPP) is expected to hold over 
time such that exchange rate expectations adjust partly to the relative price 
differentials between the two countries. ε t refers to all other factors that might 
affect exchange rate expectations (eg. “confidence”, information on real 
macroeconomic variables, etc). 
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where: M
s
t = nominal money stock, M
d
t = real money demand, Pt = price level, yt 
= real income and Vt = vector of other factors impacting money demand 
(financial innovations, inflation, etc.). Assume, for simplicity, that P
t is normalized 
to one to begin with. 
Assume the economy is originally in equilibrium at point 0 (Figure 1). 
Assume a crisis of confidence (reasons for this are unimportant here), such that 
(∆ e
e
t+1 + rpt) jumps up. This leads to a rise in the horizontal parity line from aa to 
bb. The rise in local interest rates implies a reduction in money demand. Thus, at 
1, M
s > M
d. This excess liquidity in the economy is translated into a capital 
outflow. This is usually the beginning of a crisis. 
What are the available policy options available to the monetary authorities 
faced with such a scenario? 
 
2.2  The “Do Nothing” Option 
If the authorities do nothing, the drain in liquidity in the economy implies a 
reduction in real money stock. Eventually, M




1 such that 
the domestic money market is back in equilibrium at point 2 in the near term 
(Figure 2). Over time, the domestic deflationary pressures ought to lead to an 
anticipated currency appreciation (from eq. 3), leading to a movement down of 
the interest parity line. This will be followed by capital inflows and an increase in 
money supply until a new equilibrium is attained (the equilibrium is below point 2 
but may or may not coincide with point 0). 
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2.3  Impact of Capital Outflows on Domestic Money Supply 
But what actually happens to money supply with capital outflows? The answer to this is far from obvious. 
Consider the following set of equations:  
 
M
s  =  mm*MB       (4) 
MB = NDA + NFA          (5) 
N F A   =   e * R        ( 6 )  
 
 
where: mm = money multiplier, MB = monetary base, NDA = net domestic 
assets, NFA = net foreign assets and R = foreign exchange (forex) reserves. Eq. 
4 states that the aggregate money supply equals the money base multiplied by 
the money multiplier. Eq. 5 states that the monetary base consists of two 
components, net domestic assets and net foreign assets. Eq. 6 states that the 
stock of net foreign assets equals the stock of forex reserves multiplied by the 
nominal exchange rate (foreign currency per US$).  
Assume the country initially maintained a fixed exchange rate. With 
appropriate substitutions and taking the first derivative of M
s w.r.t. to K derives: 
 
dM
s/dK  = MB(dmm/dK) + mm(dMB/dK) 
       = MB(dmm/dK) + mm[(dNDA/dK) + E(dR/dK)]  (7) 
 
 
dNDA/dK: During a financial crisis this term is usually negative as the 
monetary authorities attempt to sterilize capital outflows from the domestic 
financial system, especially deposit taking ones. What might motivate this bailout 
(i.e. lender of last resort)? Capital flows tend to be largely intermediated via the   5
banking system, and bank lending is the dominant form of funding in most 
developing countries. Consequently, a sustained drop in bank lending following 
sharp capital outflows and declines in net worth will be severely detrimental to 
real economic activity. Figure 3 offers some indication of the increase in claims 
by the domestic monetary authority in Thailand on the domestic financial 
institutions during the period of massive capital outflows in 1997 and early 1998
3.    
dm/dK: During a financial crisis this term is usually negative (see Mishkin, 
Chapter 16, pp.428-9 and Hubbard, Chapter 17, p.459). The reason for this is 
clear once we consider the definition of the M2 multiplier. To be sure, let the 
narrow money (M1) = currency in circulation (C) plus demand/checking deposits 
(D). Let M2 = M1 + Savings deposits and small denomination time deposits 
(generically referred to as S). Let R denote reserve holdings by banks which in 
turn are made up of required reserves and excess excess reserves. Thus, the 
M2 multiplier = mm = [c + d + s]/[c + r], where all italicized variables in small 
letters are denoted as a proportion of demand/checking deposits. During a 
financial crisis, individuals will prefer to ensure their financial savings are as 
liquid as possible, leading to a shift of funds from s to d. In addition, if there are 
concerns about the viability of the banking system, there may be a sharp 
increase in c at the expense of all types of deposits. In addition, during the 
period of capital outflows, banks on their part may be prefer to maintain a degree 
of liquidity, resulting in an increase in r.  
                                            
3 For details on the Thai crisis and policy response thereof, see BOT (1998) and Rajan 
(2001). 
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dR/dK: This term refers to the impact of capital flows on forex reserves. 
Even if one assumes a fixed exchange rate regime, this effect is generally 
ambiguous. Why? Consider eq. (7) below which is the usual balance of 
payments accounting identity. 
 
dR = CAB + dK        (8) 
 
If there is no change in the current account balance, dR/dK > 0. This is 
straightforward, i.e. capital outflows lead to a drain on forex reserves while 
capital inflows lead to forex reserve accumulation. However, with capital 
outflows, governments may restrict imports such that the CAB rises. If the rise in 
CAB outweighs the capital outflows, forex reserves could actually grow
4. A likely 
scenario is that initially the direct impact of the capital outflows exceeds the 
indirect effects via the current account such that forex reserves decline. Over 
time, however, as capital flows stabilize, the decline in the current account 
balance continues to improve (due to curb in imports and resurgence in exports 
following real exchange rate depreciation). This is apparent from Figures 4 and 5 
which reveals an initial decline or stagnation in gross forex reserves in East Asia 
between mid 1997 and mid 1998 before they started to be replenished as the 
region’s current account balances improved
5.     
Putting this all together, the net impact of capital flows on money supply is 
an empirical issue. An empirical regularity appears to be that the monetary base 
                                            
4 Though this inevitably is accompanied by sharp recessions as in the case of East Asia 
in 1997-98. 
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(MB) is more or less constant as the increase in domestic credit (NDA) to 
accommodate a run on the financial institutions offsets the fall in reserves (NFA), 
but the money multiplier (mm) declines sharply such that overall money supply 
(M
s) falls. There are always exceptions to this stylization. For instance, during the 
East Asian crisis of 1997-98, Korea’s and Thailand’s monetary bases remained 
more or less constant between 1996 and 1998, that of Indonesia saw a 
sustained rapid expansion, and Malaysia experienced sharp jumps between Q2: 
1996 and Q4: 1997 before falling sharply (Figure 6).  
 
2.4  Depreciating the Currency 
Let us consider the case where the monetary authority continues to 
sterilize capital outflows in order to resist the fall in the MB, as in Thailand, for 
instance. The persistent monetary disequilibrium in turn implies capital outflows 
continue unabated. MacIntyre (1999) succinctly summarizes the course of 
events in Thailand during this period: 
 
A side effect of injecting large scale emergency funding into 
the…failing finance companies was blowing out the money 
supply…This served to sharpen the fundamental contradiction 
in the government’s overall macroeconomic position. At the 
same time as it was pumping money into insolvent finance 
companies to keep them afloat, the central bank was also 
                                                                                                                                  
5 See Bird and Rajan (2003) and Rajan and Siregar (2003) for discussions of forex 
reserve management in East Asia post-crisis. The data on reserves excludes swap 
liabilities.    8
spending down..(forex)..reserves to prop up the exchange 
rate…(T)his was not a sustainable strategy (p.14). 
 
Indeed, at some stage, the country’s stock of forex reserves declines to 
some “minimum level” (assume zero or simplicity), necessitating a break in the 
currency peg (i.e. currency devaluation). This occurred in Thailand in July 1997, 
followed by Indonesia in August 1997 and other regional currencies soon after. 
What might happen following this expenditure switching policy? Two possibilities 
need to be considered: 
One, in the “conventional” case, (a) depreciation is expansionary such 




1 and (b) since the 
expected depreciation has materialized, ∆ e
e
t+1  ! 0 , such that there is a 
consequent shift down of the parity line from bb to cc (Figure 7). Eventually a 
new equilibrium (point 3) is attained corresponding to stability of the capital 
account, improvement in the CAB and rise in output. In other words, depreciation 
is the end of the crisis
6. Indeed, it is trivial to note that depending on the 
magnitude of the movements of the interest parity line and the money demand 
curve, the economy could be faced with capital inflows and resulting increase in 
domestic money supply/expected exchange rate appreciation. This is consistent 
with the boom-bust-boom scenario that seems to plague emerging economies 
(Bird and Rajan, 2001). 
                                            
6 Insofar as the devaluation also has some inflationary effects, from eq. 2, it is expected 
that the new equilbrium (3) will be higher than the initial one (0).    9
Two, it is possible that the exchange rate depreciation leads to a hike in 
the risk premium such that the r.h.s. of eq. 1 remains unchanged or even rises 
post-devaluation, thus intensifying capital outflows (from bb to dd in Figure 8). 
This in turn may occur for a number of reasons: loss of credibility of monetary 
authorities; concerns about the impact of the currency depreciation of the 
financial and real sectors (elaborated upon below); loss of exchange rate anchor 
or shock of revelation of the dramatic decline in forex reserves and general weak 
state of the economy (as in the case of Thailand in June-July 1997), etc. In other 
words, where devaluation is part of a credible macroeconomic strategy, is 
combined with appropriate counter-inflationary fiscal and monetary policy, and 
leads to a new exchange rate that is perceived by private capital markets to be 
close to the equilibrium real rate or below it, it will have a positive effect on 
creditworthiness and capital flows. Where, on the other hand, it is perceived as a 
panic measure, is combined with excessively expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policy and leads to a new rate that is still seen as involving currency 
overvaluation, it will be associated with further capital outflows. 
For instance, in the case of Thailand, in the period leading up to the 
devaluation (i.e. first quarter of 1997) only the non-bank sector experienced 
capital outflows (Table 1). More precisely it was the non-resident baht accounts 
(NRBAs) in particular, but also the “other loans” component that recorded net 
outflows. NRBAs are essentially nostro accounts held in domestic banks that 
serve various transactions, including baht clearing for foreign currency-related 
transactions and stock market transactions by foreigners. Net FDI inflows 
remained positive throughout 1997 and portfolio flows too only changed direction   10
in November and December 1997. Private bank capital flows turned around 
sharply by over $10 billion between the first half and second halves of 1997. This 
reversal intensified in 1998, with outflows reaching almost $14 billion. Of 
significance here is the fact that funds were still flowing into the country during 
the first half of 1997 right up to the devaluation. It was only after the devaluation 
that there was a massive exodus of these banking sector flows. Capital outflows 
from NRBAs were $3.5 billion in the first half of 1997, over $2 billion in the 
second half of the year and slowed to about $2.7 billion for the 1998 as a whole. 
According to some reports, Thailand was pulled back from the brink of national 
bankruptcy at the end of 1997 only because creditors agreed to roll over their 
foreign loans to local firms (Bangkok Post, December 22, 1997).  
 
It is possible that a pre-emptive devaluation in the early stages of the 
crisis may reduce this “shock impact”, thus precluding as large a rise in the risk 
premium term. Thus, maximum effort needs to be exerted into avoiding the 
appearance if devaluation as being a panic measure. In this context, an 
exchange rate stitch in time may save nine! Governments in liaison with the IMF 
need to address the risk that devaluation may spook private capital markets. 
Devaluation must be presented as part of a credible economic strategy, and 
foreign capital needs to be bailed in to support it. 
Apart from the shock impact noted above, depreciation may also be 
contractionary in and of itself such that output (yt) declines (Figure 9). The 
recessions ranged from 7 percent in Korea to 17 percent in Indonesia in 1998. 
The BOT (1998) report on the Thai crisis outlined the “official” reasons behind 
why a devaluation of the baht was perceived as doing more harm than good:   11
high import content of Thai exports implying limited competitiveness benefit from 
a weakened currency; inflationary effects of devaluation leading to wage-price 
spiral; and unhedged foreign currency debts of corporates leading to 
bankruptcies and unemployment and deterioration in asset quality of financial 
institutions due to a weakened corporate. The balance sheet effects due to large 
unhedged exposure to short term foreign currency denominated debt was a 
particularly important dimension in the case of the East Asian crisis. According to 
Dornbusch (2001): 
A  new-style crisis involves doubt about credit worthiness of the 
balance sheet of a significant part of the economy – private or public 
– and the exchange rate…when there is a question about one, the 
implied capital flight makes it immediately a question about 
both…the central part of the new-style crisis is the focus on balance 
sheets and capital flight…Because new-style crises involve the 
national balance sheet they involve a far more dramatic impact on 
economic activity than mere current account disturbances; this far 
larger impact arises both in terms of magnitude of the financial shock 
as well as disorganization effects stemming from illiquidity or 
bankruptcy (pp.2-3). 
 
There is also a large body of literature that developed in the 1960s and 
1970s which explains why devaluation in emerging economies may be 
contractionary. It is, however, unlikely that the “conventional” contractionary 
effects of devaluation via the current account can explain the magnitude and 
ferocity of some economic contractions following devaluation (see Bird and 
Rajan, 2002 and references cited within).  
Whatever the exact reasons, if devaluation proves to be contractionary, 





2, such that domestic 
disequilibrium is further exacerbated (Figure 8). In other words, in this case,   12
depreciation exacerbates the crisis, leading possibly to outright economic 
collapse
7. This seems to have been the experience of a number of emerging 
economies in recent times, including those in East Asia. 
   
2.4  Interest Rate Policy 
Another common policy response to currency bearishness is to raise 
interest rates sharply which effectively involves a leftward shift of the money 
supply (M
s) curve. Note that if the authorities are keen on building forex reserves 
via capital inflows, there is a need for a sufficiently contractionary monetary 
policy such that domestic money market equilibrium exceeds interest rates given 
by the interest parity condition (point 5 in Figure 10).  
Once again, however, the impact of this policy response is not 
unambiguous. This expenditure reducing policy may in fact have severe 
contractionary effects, thus reducing M
d. Apart from the conventional 
transmission channels via which tight interest rate policy may affect output (see 
Chapter 25 in Mishkin and Chapter 27 in Hubbard), in highly leveraged 
economies, high interest rates may make it impossible for a country to service its 
debt (the so-called “Laffer curve” effects of monetary policy a la Furman, and 
Stiglitz, 1998), further swelling the share of non-performing loans (NPLs) held by 
financial institutions. Decapitalized banks may in turn curtail their lending, 
                                            
7 While devaluation may have inflationary effects, we assume that the indirect 
deflationary effects via output exceed the direct inflationary effects via pass through. 
This assumption appears valid for the East Asian countries save Indonesia which was 
not faced by price pressures during the 1997-98 financial crisis (Boorman et al., 2000). 
The assumption may not be valid for other developing regions, especially those with a 
history of price instability.     13
intensifying the recession (supply side effect). In addition, the collapse in asset 
prices that tend to accompany - in fact precede - devaluation could deepen the 
“credit crunch” caused initially by loss of access to international capital markets 
(BOT, 1998).  
Thus, where tight monetary policy leads to increased concerns regarding 
“riskiness and destruction of collateral associated with the balance sheet effects 
of the crisis itself” (Boorman, et al., 2000), it will prove to be counterproductive. 
Rather than domestic monetary policy neutralizing the recessionary effects of 
devaluation, it may lead to additional capital outflows that enhance them. On the 
other hand, if the authorities relax domestic monetary policy in order to offset to 
some extent the effects of capital outflows on domestic liquidity, they will 
neutralize the recessionary effects and may avoid a potential collapse in output. 
However, the current account effect will then be moderated and it will take longer 
to replenish depleted forex reserves. Moreover, since the rise in the interest rate 
will be less pronounced, this could delay the return of foreign capital. In 
circumstances where governments are anxious to avoid severe recession in the 
aftermath of devaluation immediately following a crisis, it is easy to see how they 
may be persuaded to combine currency devaluation with some degree of 
domestic monetary relaxation (for instance, see Aghion et al., 2000). The 
problem then is that monetary relaxation may be interpreted by markets as 
representing exactly the kind of macroeconomic laxity that they fear. Yet there 
remain Lucas-type dangers with this strategy since capital markets may respond 
negatively if they perceive monetary policy as being insufficiently tight.   14
What did the East Asian countries actually do during the crisis period? 
According to IMF economists: 
Monetary policy in the IMF-supported programs in the Asian 
countries tried to walk a narrow line, seeking to resist downward 
pressure on exchange rates while avoiding a crippling effect on the 
real economy…The design and implementation of monetary policy 
had to work under significant constraints. High debt-equity ratios in 
the corporate sectors as well as systemic and structural problems 
made the financial sector more vulnerable to increases in the 
interest rates.. (Boorman et al., 2000, pp.31-2). 
 
  This conundrum helps explain the initial policy vacillations by the countries 
which initially raised but then quickly lowered interest rates, only to raise them 
again substantially following intensified bearish pressures between 1997 and 
1998. Specifically, while Korea and Thailand did eventually raise interest rates in 
1998 to curb the selling pressures, Indonesia continued with its policy of 
monetary laxity primarily to infuse liquidity to the financial system (Figure 11). 
This inevitably led to inflationary pressures and heightened expectations of an 
exchange rate depreciation (from eq. 2). From eq. 1, it is apparent that interest 
rates in Indonesia ought to spike upwards (Figure 12). Thus, Boorman et al. 
(2000) correctly note:  
It would be highly misleading to interpret Indonesia’s high nominal 
interest rates in late 1997 and the early months of 1998 as an 
indication of tight policy; rather, they signalled a loss of confidence 
in the currency as well as in the country’s credit-worthiness.” (p.32). 
 
The large and growing disequilibrium in the domestic money market in turn 
predictably implied large-scale capital outflows and further exchange rate   15
depreciations which were self-validating (Figure 12)
8. It is of no surprise, 
therefore, that Indonesia was the country most severely impacted by the crisis
9. 
 
2.5 Capital  Controls 
   In the face of persistent capital outflows and concerns about the impact of 
currency depreciations, the monetary authorities could also attempt to curb 
capital outflows by breaking the link between domestic and international financial 
markets (eq. 1) via capital controls. This was the case of Malaysia in September 
1998 which imposed wide-ranging capital controls to penalize offshore currency 
trading and short-term portfolio flows (Bird and Rajan, 2000)
10. The problem with 
this policy option is that as long as there remains an incentive for capital to flee 
the country, the controls will be leaky and may thus prove ineffectual. In addition, 
there are the well known problems relating to the potential for rent-seeking 
activities (bribery, corruption and so forth) that controls generate, not to mention 
the high enforcement costs, the inevitable creation of a black market and the 
general porousness of quantitative restrictions, particularly in the medium and 
longer terms (Bird and Rajan, 2000). This said, Malaysia’s flirtation with capital 
controls has been rather short-lived and has been at least partly successful 
(Ariyoshi et al., 2000 and Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001). Many observers have drawn 
inspiration from this to suggest that an appropriate policy response to sharp 
                                            
8 Another indication of monetary policy laxity in Indonesia was the sharply negative real 
interest rates on offer in that country in 1997 and 1998 (Boorman et al., 2000).   
 
9 To be sure, the country was also faced with severe socio-political instabilities that 
undoubtedly contributed to its economic collapse.   16
capital outflows is some combination of restoration of confidence quickly via 
large-scale liquidity financing, imposing standstills on external creditors and 
imposing capital controls to try and prevent capital flight
  (Yoshitomi and Ohno, 
1999). 
3. Conclusion   
Using simple tools that are taught in any typical undergraduate Money 
and Banking course, this paper has attempted to rationalize the impact of 
financial crisis and capital outflows in emerging economies, and the possible 
policy options and dilemmas thereof. Examples have been drawn freely from 
East Asia which was faced with such a crisis and series of policy conundrums in 
1997-98. 
From a policy perspective, an important conclusion from the preceding 
analysis is that while managing a conventional current account crisis involves a 
judicious combination of adjustment and financing, resolving a crisis involving 
sharp capital outflows (“capital account crisis”) predominantly involves restoring 
confidence by managing/anticipating expectations. It is therefore a much more 
imprecise and messier task. Accordingly, the emphasis is best placed on crisis 
prevention to stem the build-up of weaknesses in the first instance.  
     
                                                                                                                                  
10 Indonesia and Thailand also imposed restraints on offshore trading of their currencies 
(Ishii et al., 2001).   17
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Table 1 
Thailand: Composition of Net Private Capital Inflows (US$ billions), 1997-1999 
 
1998   1997 1998






   Commercial banks 
      of which Recapitalization 
   BIBFs 
 
Non-banks 
   Direct Investment 
     Foreign direct investment
a 
     Thai direct investment 
abroad 
   Other Loans 
   Portfolio investment 
     Equity securities 
     Debt securities 
   Nonresident baht account 
   Trade Credits 




















































































Notes:   a) Excluding $2.1 billion in bank recapitalization 
Source: Bank of Thailand  
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Liquidity Infusion into Thai Financial System 
Q1: 1995 = 100 
          Notes:  Valuation in Thai Baht    
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             Notes:   Valuation in US dollars  





Current Account Balances as a Proportion of GDP in East Asia 
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             Notes:   Valuation in Local Currencies 




















































GDP Growth Rate 
(percentage) 
  Notes:  Year-on-year changes in US dollar terms 
  Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF  
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Figure 11 
Growth in Broad Money Supply (M2) 
(percentage) 
Notes:   Year-on-year change in US dollars 





Three-Month Interbank Lending Rate in East Asia 
(percentage) 
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